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THE SEC AND COURT-APPOINTED DIRECTORS: TIME
TO TAILOR THE DIRECTOR TO FIT THE SUIT
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has often requested
ancillary relief' beyond that expressly authorized by statute to address
allegations of corporate misconduct. During the latter half of the
1970s, courts approved without analytical inquiry settlements that re-
quired the appointment of directors2 not previously affiliated with the
corporate defendant. This intervention into corporate structure,
though not ordered unless consented to by the defendant, is based only
on the broad equitable powers of a federal district court to issue injunc-
tive relief for violations of the federal securities laws and to effectuate
the legislative objective behind those laws? The SEC has, however,
expanded the use of this injunctive relief and thereby detached the di-
1. The concept of ancillary relief, developed soon after initial passage of the securities laws,
served to implement the injunctive relief authorized by statute. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) (power to enforce implies power to utilize available proce-
dures or actions to make recovery effective); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798,
802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("existence of a remedy is implicit under general principles of the law"); SEC
v Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. DeL 1943) (receiver appointed by court to implement
injunction). See notes 13-30 infra and accompanying text. Other ancillary relief besides appoint-
ment of directors and receivers includes rescission of transactions, prohibitions against future
transactions, share voting restrictions, appointment of advisory professionals, and disgorgement of
monies improperly acquired. For an in-depth discussion of the various types of ancillary relief,
see Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions-II, 5 REv. SEC. REG. 949 (1972).
2. One of the initial cases employing court-appointed directors was SEC v. VTR, Inc. The
court, in lieu of appointing the requested receiver, directed the election of four designated in-
dependent directors to sit on the five person board. These individuals were to determine the exact
amount of funds misappropriated by management as well as supervise the filing of proper annual
reports and proxy statements. 32 SEC ANN. REP. 116-17 (1966). The arguments of defense coun-
sel not only prevailed but also proved to be an accurate assessment of what could be accomplished
by court appointment of new directors in response to management fraud. In contrast to the usual
results that accompany the assignment of a receiver, the corporation continued its business and
made approximately $1.4 million in restitution. See Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested
Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 Bus. LAW. 1323, 1326 (Special Issue 1976).
Ironically, in VTR the SEC argued against a remedy that it would use extensively in the 1970s.
For articles discussing the court appointment of directors in SEC injunctive actions, see Farrand,
Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HA.v. L. REv. 1779 (1976); Malley, Far-
Reaching Equitable Remedies Under the Securities Acts and The Growth ofFederal Corporate Law,
17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47 (1975); Treadway, SEC Enforcement Techniques: Expanding and
Exotic Forms ofAncillaryRelief, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637 (1975); Comment, Court-Appointed
Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law EnforcementActions, 64 GEO. L. J. 737 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Ancillary Relief]; Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Remedies].
3. See notes 13-30 infra and accompanying text.
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rector appointment remedy from its legal underpinnings. In addition,
the Commission has employed director appointments as a means to
pursue policies of corporate governance rather than merely to remedy
alleged violations of law.'
This Note will trace the development of court-appointed directors in
SEC injunctive actions and analyze both the legal justifications under-
lying the remedy and the practical aspects of this type of consent de-
cree. This Note will then explain and comment upon the relationship
between the appointment of directors to redress alleged wrongdoing
and the Commission's influence on corporate governance as a means
for reform. Finally, this Note will suggest that the SEC modify use of
director appointments to return the remedy to its legal foundation and
will point to recent developments in the Commission's approach that
enhance the usefulness of the remedy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COURT-APPOINTED DIRECTORS AS
ANCILLARY TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The SEC is responsible for implementing and enforcing laws that
promote integrity in the trading and distribution of securities and that
protect the public from potential abuse.- The Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empower the Commission to
bring suits for infractions in the federal district courts6 and to seek civil
injunctions against "any person. . . engaged or about to engage in any
acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation" of these
laws.7 No provision in any of the federal securities laws, however, ex-
4. Due to the nature of the consent decree process, the SEC has been able to secure settle-
ment terms arguably beyond the reach of the ancillary relief contemplated by the courts. See
notes 31-37 & 100-02 infra and accompanying text. For an article critical of SEC use of its civil
injunctive remedy, see Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunctions: It's Time to Give the Commission
an Administrative Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 345 (1979).
5. See Sommer, The Impact ofthe SEC on Corporate Governance, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.,
Summer 1977, at 115, 118.
6. Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
7. The 1933 and 1934 Acts contain nearly identical language authorizing SEC civil injunc-
tive actions. See Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). Section 18(f) of the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79n(f) (1976), has a similar provision, and the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, § 322(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1976), adopts the enforcement provision of the 1933 Act.
Both the Investment Advisor and Investment Company Acts authorize the Commission to enforce
compliance by lawsuit and to enjoin illegal acts or practices. Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
[Vol. 60:507
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pressly authorizes court appointment of directors.8 Changes in the
composition of corporate boards occur instead through permanent in-
junctions negotiated by the Commission, consented to by the defend-
ant, and entered by the court.
The settlements stipulate that the defendant neither admits nor de-
nies the SEC's allegations. The flexibility of the approach permits crea-
tive formulation of relief that the parties can tailor to address a
particular situation.9 Use of the consent decree process encounters lit-
tle judicial resistance ° and is attractive to both the Commission and
the defendant corporations. 1 Decrees that require court-appointed
outside directors are subject to criticism, however, because they intrude
into an area traditionally regulated by state law and infringe upon the
principle of shareholder democracy.' 2
A. Legal Underpinnings of the Director Appointment Remedy
Certain sections of the Securities Acts authorize the Commission to
seek court orders permanently enjoining defendants from violating the
securities laws.' 3 Because standards governing the issuance of statutory
injunctions are broad, federal courts are guided more by legislative
objectives and public interest' 4 than by the showing of irreparable
§ 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80-9(e) (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
41(e) (1976).
8. See Farrand, supra note 2, at 1781; Malley, supra note 2, at 58; Wolfson, From the Board-
room-Needed" statutory reform to improve consent decree process, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr.
1979, at 19; Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 740; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra
note 2, at 1189.
9. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 133; Sporkin, SECDevelopments in Litigation andthe Mold-
mg of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAw. 121, 122 (Special Issue, 1974); Comment, Equitable Remedies,
supra note 2, at 1192.
10. Courts are reluctant to interfere with a settlement agreed to by the parties. See notes 101-
16 infra and accompanying text. When requests for this relief have been presented in cases liti-
gated on the merits, the outcome has been different. See notes 117-24 infra and accompanying
text.
11. See Merrifield, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus. LAW.
1583, 1627 n.160 (1977); Wolfson, supra note 8, at 19; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2,
at 1192.
12. See notes 126-40 infra and accompanying text.
13. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976).
14. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
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harm and the other specific elements required in private litigation.'5
Although injunctive relief is no longer properly characterized as a
"mild prophylactic," 6 the SEC's perception that the relief is inade-
quate has resulted in expanded remedial orders, including the court
appointment of directors. 17
Congress granted the federal courts jurisdiction to hear "all suits in
equity. . . to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Securities
Acts]."' 8 Once a court's equity power is invoked, it may fashion appro-
priate relief to remedy the misconduct and prevent future violations.' 9
Courts, when issuing an injunction, have the power to order a broad
range of measures designed to effectuate the congressional scheme.20
15. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Tax Serv.,
Inc., 357 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1966); Brandford v. SEC, 278 F.2d 566, 567 (9th Cir. 1960).
16. This label was used by both the Supreme Court and the dissenting judges of the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963), rev'g, 306 F.2d 606
(2d Cir. 1962) (en banc). The Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979), held that SEC injunctions could have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent private ac-
tions. Id at 332-33. See Mathews, supra note 4, at 352. See generally Mathews, Litigation and
Settlement of SEC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 215, 276-77
(1980).
17. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 128-31; Sporkin, supra note 9, at 122-23. See also notes 31-
37 infra and accompanying text.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). See also Securities Act of
1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
19. See, eg., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386, 390-91 (1970); J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980); Handler v.
SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1979); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d
162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). See also 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JUIS-
PRUDENCE §§ 114-15, 171(1), 181, 231, 236(a), 239(c) (5th ed. 1941); Farrand, supra note 2, at
1781; Sporkin, supra note 9, at 122-23; Treadway, supra note 2, at 639; Comment, Ancillary Relief,
supra note 2, at 741; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1189.
20. See, ag., Mills v. Electric Auto-lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-89 (1970); J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35-(1964); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-
92 (1960) (quoting Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 203 (1839)); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980);
Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1979); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See also Farrand, supra note 2, at 1781, 1784;
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 383, 395-
421 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of"Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 797, 799-800 (1957); Comment,
Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 741; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1189.
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This judicial power, however, is not without limits. The relief or-
dered may not exceed the boundaries of the legislative purpose even
when furthering that purpose,21 and it may not surpass its remedial
function by conveying punitive implication.22 The SEC, as plaintiff,
must demonstrate a clear need for the relief requested.23 In addition,
the courts must balance the harm to competing interests against the
benefits to be derived from the proposed resolution.24
The federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction25 supports judicial involve-
ment in corporate structure to address an invasion of a federally pro-
tected right.26 Legal theory and precedent 27 support court appointment
of nonaffiliated directors28 to the extent such action remains within
21. See, e.g.. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62 (1975); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 161 (1971); Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 744. The cases cited in note
20 suFra extend the court's enforcement power beyond that authorized by statute so that relief
may be granted to effectuate legislative policy. By implication, then, such relief cannot justifiably
eclipse the policy it is intended to serve.
22. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.) ("the SEC may seek other
than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is reme-
dial relief and is not a penalty assessment"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Beck v. SEC, 430
F 2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1970) (court nullified a Commission order suspending broker because it
was punitive and not remedial). See generall' 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 19, §§ 432-447.
23. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 181 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919
(1961); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Golconda Mining
Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Farrand, supra note 2, at 1809; Malley,
supra note 2, at 54; Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 755.
24. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); DiGiovanni v. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64,70-72 (1935); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40,54
(7th Cir. 1972); Farrand, supra note 2, at 1812-14; Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 749.
In this instance the competing interests are the need to redress an alleged violation by furtherance
of congressional purpose opposed by the affront to state corporation law and the principles of
shareholder democracy. See notes 126-40 infra. Transcending this conflict is the desire to ensure
investor confidence, protect shareholder interest, and preserve the integrity of the securities
market.
25. See 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 19, § 17 1(1).
26. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). The Supreme Court stated:
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the be-
ginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Id at 684 (footnotes omitted). See also notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text.
27. See cases cited in notes 19 & 20 supra.
28. The SEC does not limit its requests to appointment of one or several directors. The
various terms entered by courts regarding numbers of appointees are discussed generally at notes
3 1-33 infra.
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traditional limitations on equitable relief and is necessary to secure the
goals Congress sought in passing the securities laws.29 Whether the ju-
diciary actually endorses the director appointment remedy is uncertain,
however, because the corporate defendant's consent to the settlement
precludes appellate review on the merits. 30
B. Settlements Affecting the Composition of Corporate Boards
Consent orders that result in appointment of outside directors con-
form to no definite pattern. Requirements vary from a specified
number of appointees31 to a majority of independent directors for the
reconstituted board,32 with a few demanding an entirely new group of
individuals.33 Some decrees outline responsibilities for the new board34
29. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928); SEC v. Dennett, 429
F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Farrand, supra note 2, at 1806, 1809; Treadway, upra
note 2, at 639-40; Comment, Ancillary Relief supra note 2, at 740; Comment, Equitable Remedies,
su.pra note 2, at 1194.
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Vornado, Inc., 24 SEC DOCKET 437, 438 (Lit. Rel. No. 9531) (D.D.C.
Dec. 18, 1981) (alleged falsely disclosed and manipulated operating reports-appointment of one
director); SEC v. Allison, 21 SEC DOCKET 208, 209 (Lit. Rel. No. 9205) (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 1980)
(alleged antifraud, registration, and reporting violations-appointment of two directors); SEC v.
International Systems & Controls Corp., 18 SEC DOCKET 1410, 1410 (Lit. Rel. No. 8953) (D.D.C.
Dec. 17, 1979) (alleged antifraud reporting, proxy, and FCPA violations-appointment of three
directors); SEC v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 17 SEC DOCKET 146, 146 (Lit. Rel. No. 8701) (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 23, 1979) (failure to disclose personal use of corporate funds-nomination of three
independent directors).
32. See, e.g., SEC v. Covington Bros. Technologies, 21 SEC DOCKET 903, 904 (Lit. Rel. No.
9253) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1980) (alleged antifraud, manipulation, registration, and beneficial own-
ership reporting violations-company to use best efforts to secure a majority of independent direc-
tors); SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 20 SEC DOCKET 683, 684 (Lit. Rel. No. 9129) (C.D. Cal. July 8,
1980) (alleged use of corporate funds for personal gain-restructure of board to achieve independ-
ent director majority); SEC v. Generics Corp. of Am., 8 SEC DOCKET 1004, 1004 (Lit. Rel. No.
7224) (D.NJ. Jan. 2, 1976) (alleged antifraud, proxy, and reporting violations-board reconsti-
tuted to include a majority of independent directors).
33. See, e.g., SEC v. Stewart Energy Systems of Idaho, Inc., 18 SEC DOCKET 796, 796 (Lit.
Rel. No. 8900) (E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 1979) (alleged registration and antifraud violations-com-
pany agreed to appoint a new board, although a minority could have connection with past man-
agement); SEC v. Challenge Homes, Inc., 9 SEC DOCKET 291,291 (Lit. Rel. No. 7324) (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 23, 1976) (alleged antifraud violations-order provided for appointment of new board of
directors).
34. See, e.g., SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 16 SEC DocKET 643, 643 (Lit. Rel. No. 8633)
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1979) (maintain procedures at all directors' meetings that result in review of
corporate responsibilities under the federal securities laws); SEC v. Rousell, 10 SEC DOCKET 263,
264 (Lit. Rel. No. 7529) (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1976) (order giving shareholders the opportunity to
rescind shares tendered or receive price differential; assign irrevocable proxies to a majority of
independent directors for three years); SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, 7 SEC DOCKET 856, 856
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and others contain no specific directions.35 One typical requirement of
these settlements, however, is the creation of one or more board com-
mittees comprised of at least a majority of outside directors.36 In addi-
tion, the defendant frequently agrees to the appointment of a special
counsel who has investigatory and reporting responsibilities independ-
ent from the new board.37
The propriety of these additional requirements depends upon the na-
ture of the alleged violations. For example, decrees that call for a ma-
jority of independent directors may be justifiable if the conduct of the
previous board members was sufficiently harmful to the shareholder
and public interests.38 The less the settlement terms relate to the al-
leged violations, however, the greater the punitive implications.39
Moreover, as the extent of intrusion into internal corporate affairs ap-
pears to exceed the seriousness of the misfeasance, the ability of a court
to sustain the relief is diminished.4°
(Lit. Rel. No. 7072) (S.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 1975) (chairman of new executive committee to serve as
chief executive officer until new trustees elect CEO-for 18 months CEO must be one of new
trustees or approved by Commission).
35. See, e.g., SEC v. Stewart Energy Systems of Idaho, Inc., 18 SEC DocK=T 796 (Lit. Rel.
No. 8900) (E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 1979); SEC v. Invesco Int'l Corp., 12 SEC DocKET 1369 (Lit. Rel.
No. 8031) (N.D. Ga. July 19, 1977); SEC v. Inventive Indus., Inc., 12 SEC DocKEr 808 (Lit. Rel.
No. 7959) (S.D. Tex. June 7, 1977); SEC v. Mire, 11 SEC DocKEr 1266 (Lit. Rel. No. 7699) (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 20, 1976).
36. See notes 47-53 infra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 54-61 infra and accompanying text.
38. See, ag., SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 20 SEC DocKET 683 (Lit. Rel. No. 9129) (C.D. Cal.
July 8, 1980) (chairman's personal finances substantially benefitted by transactions harmful to the
corporation); SEC v. TDA Indus., Inc., 9 SEC DocKEr 534, 535 (Lit. Rel. No. 7369) (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 1976) (directors removed for engineering payment of $100,000 sham finder's fee to their
nominee--court ordered appointment of five independent directors); SEC v. Generics Corp. of
Am., 8 SEC DocKEr 1004, 1004 (Lit. Rel. No. 7224) (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 1976) (former chairman's
alteration of computer records materially affected financial statements and registration of stock
distribution-majority independent directors ordered, board to prevent former chairman from
serving as officer or director of corporation). See also Sporkin, supra note 9, at 123.
39. See, ag., SEC v. Basic Food Indus., Inc., 15 SEC DocKEr 133, 134 (Lit. Rel. No. 8440)
(D.D.C. June 20, 1978) (in addition to disgorgement, director was prohibited from professional
association with a public company for nine months and subject to notice requirements for five
years); SEC v. Inflight Servs., Inc., 13 SEC DocKEr 633, 634 (Lit. Rel. No. 8182) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
3, 1977) (former officer enjoined from employment by public company for three and one-half
years); SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 11 SEC DOCKET 1113, 1114 (Lit. Rel. No. 7681) (W.D.N.C. Dec.
2, 1976) (former director compelled to disgorge $18,000 and then enjoined from professional asso-
ciation with any public company for three years).
40. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
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1. Decrees That Order a Majority of Independent Directors
Settlements that call for a majority of independent directors are di-
visible into three basic groups, each, requiring a different degree of
Commission involvement. One extreme allows the corporate defend-
ant complete control in selecting a new majority,41 while the other re-
quires Commission approval of every new director.42 The third format
is a hybrid whereby the Commission approves of a certain number of
directors and the corporation is responsible for securing the
remainder.43
As the corporation's authority over the selection process increases,
there is less conflict between the settlement and principles of state law
and shareholder democracy.' Although the bluntness of SEC intru-
sion into internal corporate affairs is thus cushioned, courts nonetheless
should closely scrutinize the arrangement. 4- The facts of the case must
convince the court that such relief is necessary to remedy the past mis-
conduct and to protect against future wrongdoing.46
2. Committee Mandates
One form of additional relief, which supplements the appointment of
directors, requires the defendant to establish a board committee with
specified duties. These orders require that outside directors compose
either a majority47 or an entirety" of the committee membership.
41. See, e.g., SEC v. Isomedics, Inc., 20 SEC DocKET 873 (Lit. Rel. No. 9147) (S.D.N.Y. July
29, 1980); SEC v. Invesco Int'l Corp., 12 SEC DocKET 1369 (Lit. Rel. No. 8031) (N.D. Ga. July
19, 1977); SEC v. Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc., 6 SEC DocKEr 203 (Lit. Rel. No. 6700) (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 1975).
42. See, eg., SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 11 SEC DOCKET 1113 (Lit. Rel. No. 7681) (W.D.N.C.
Dec. 2, 1976); SEC v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 8 SEC DOcKET 517, (Lit. Rel. No. 7171) (D.D.C.
Nov. 19, 1975).
43. See, eg., SEC v. Emersons Ltd., 9 SEC DocKET 667, 668 (Lit. Rel. No. 7392) (D.D.C.
May 11, 1976).
44. State corporation codes generally outline a procedure for replacement of directors by an
internal corporate mechanism. See note 126 infra.
45. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
46. See J.1. Case Co. v, Borak, 377 U.S. 426,434 (1964) (importance of analysis of particular
fact pattern), See also note 134 nfra and accompanying text.
47, See, eg., SEC v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 23 SEC DocKET 113, 114 (Lit. Rel. No. 9394)
(D.D.C. July 15, 1981); SEC v. Isomedics, Inc., 20 SEC DocKEr 873, 873 (Lit. Rel. No. 9147)
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1980); SEC v. Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 17 SEC DocKEr 146, 147 (Lit. Rel.
No. 8701) (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 1979); SEC v. Emersons Ltd., 9 SEC DocKEr 667, 668 (Lit. Rol.
No. 7392) (D.D.C. May 11, 1976).
48. See, eg., SEC v. Covington Bros. Technologies, 21 SEC DOCKET 903, 904 (Lit. Rol. No.
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Many specify that only the newly appointed directors are eligible for
selection.49
The committees serve to remedy problems raised in the SEC's com-
plaint and to ensure against recurrence of the questioned activity. Liti-
gation and claims committees are directed to bring charges, when
appropriate, against misfeasant personnel and to negotiate settlements
of third party claims against the corporation. 0 Transaction review
committees are authorized to rescind or modify improper corporate
dealings and, in certain instances, must approve proposed transac-
tions. 51 Executive and audit committees are delegated broad oversight
authority that frequently includes the above responsibilities as well as
development of corporate policies that will result in compliance with
the securities laws and prevent other wrongdoing. 2
Settlements requiring board committees should encounter less judi-
cial resistance because state corporation codes do not address the issue
and shareholders traditionally have not had voting power in this area. 3
Even though the SEC arguably is attempting to control corporate pol-
icy, as long as the duties include remediation and prevention, commit-
tee mandates are justifiable relief.
9253) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1980); SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 20 SEC DOCKET 683, 684 (Lit. Rel. No.
9129) (C.D. Cal. July 8, 1980); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 16 SEC DOCKET 643, 643 (Lit. Rel.
No. 8633) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1979).
49. See, e.g., SEC v. International Systems & Controls Corp., 18 SEC DOCKET 1410, 1410
(Lit. ReL No. 8953) (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1979); SEC v. Rapid-American Corp., 18 SEC DOCKET 149,
150 (Lit. Rel. No. 8841) (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1979); SEC v. Houston Complex, Inc., 17 SEC DOCKET
792, 793 (Lit. Rel. No. 8766) (D. Nev. May 29, 1979).
50. See, e.g., SEC v. Allison, 21 SEC DOCKET 208, 209 (LiL Rel. No. 9205) (D.D.C. Oct. 16,
1980); SEC v. Inflight Servs., Inc., 13 SEC DOCKET 633, 633 (Lit. Rel. No. 8182) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
3, 1977); SEC v. Crown Corp., 9 SEC DOCKET 235, 236 (Lit. Rel. No. 7311) (D. Hawaii Mar. 12,
1976).
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Catawba Corp., 23 SEC DOCKET 1427, 1428 (Lit. Rel. No. 9488)
(D D.C. Nov. 2, 1981); SEC v. Rapid-American Corp., 18 SEC DOCKET 149, 150 (Lit. Rel. No.
8841) (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1979); SEC v. Montauk Corp., 15 SEC DOCKET 422, 423 (Lit. Rel. No.
8475) (D.D.C. July 25, 1978); SEC v. Continental Connector Corp., 13 SEC DOCKET 358, 359 (Lit.
Rel. No. 8155) (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1977).
52. See. ag., SEC v. Covington Bros. Technologies, 21 SEC DOCKET 903, 904 (Lit. Rel. No.
9253) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1980); SEC v. International Systems & Controls Corp., 18 SEC DOCKET
1410, 1410 (Lit. Rel. No. 8953) (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1979); SEC v. Houston Complex, Inc., 17 SEC
DOCKET 792, 793 (Lit. Re. No. 8766) (D. Nev. May 29, 1979); SEC v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 17
SEC DOCKET 406, 406 (Lit. Rel. No. 8733) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1979); SEC v. Fashion Two
Twenty, Inc., 17 SEC DOCKET 146, 147 (Lit. ReL No. 8701) (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 1979).
53. See, ag., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 304 (Deering 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (Consol. 1976); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (Page 1978). See
also ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 42 (1980).
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3. Independent Special Counsel
A second form of supplemental relief is the appointment of special
counsel. The decree may charge this. individual with specific, limited
responsibilities54 or may empower him to conduct a far-reaching inves-
tigation into any matters deemed appropriate.5 5 In all cases, the special
counsel must file reports with the Commission and the court.16 The
individual may take legal action, but only with approval of a board
committee or the entire board.57 In spite of this limitation, some settle-
ments grant counsel more expansive authority, thereby placing the in-
dividual outside the board's control. 8 Whether the board or the court
appoints the special counsel,59 there is little justification for a settle-
ment term that makes one person independently accountable to the
SEC." After securing the appointment of independent directors, the
Commission rarely can demonstrate a clear need sufficient to support
the appointment of a special counsel.6 ' More significantly, if the Com-
54. See, e.g., SEC v. International Systems & Controls Corp., 18 SEC DocKET 1410 (Lit. Rel.
No. 8953) (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1979); SEC v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 11 SEC DocKET 1113 (Lit. Rel. No.
7681) (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 1976).
55. See, eg., SEC v. Rusco Indus., Inc., 20 SEC DocKET 683, 684 (Lit. Rel. No. 9128)
(D.D.C. July 3, 1980) (special counsel to supervise audit committee's investigation of allegations);
SEC v. Stewart Energy Systems, Inc., 18 SEC DocKEr 796, 796 (Lit. Rel. No. 8900) (E.D. Wash.
Oct. 23, 1979) (special agent to report and recommend on the amount of disgorgement).
56. See, e.g., SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., 12 SEC DOcKET 415, 416 (Lit. Rel. No. 7910)
(D.D.C. May 10, 1977) (investigation into any matters the special counsel deems appropriate);
SEC v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 8 SEC DOCKET 517, 517 (Lit. Rel. No. 7171) (D.D.C. Nov. 19,
1975) (investigate all matters special counsel deems appropriate). This feature is particularly sus-
ceptible to criticism because of the freedom it affords to the special counsel. As independence
from board control increases, the special counsel begins to take on the qualities of an SEC agent.
Such a development is unwarranted, even though a court has broad equitable power to grant
ancillary relief.
57. See, e.g., SEC v. Inflight Servs., Inc., 13 SEC DocKET 633 (Lit. Rel. No. 8182) (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 3, 1977); SEC v. Crown Corp., 9 SEC DOCKET 235 (Lit. Rel. No. 7311) (D. Hawaii Mar. 12,
1976).
58. See, eg., SEC v. Stewart Energy Systems, Inc., 18 SEC DocKEr 796, 796 (Lit. Rel. No.
8900) (E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 1979) (agent will recommend to court extent to which investors should
get equity position); SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., 12 SEC DOCKET 415, 416 (Lit. Rel. No. 7910)
(D,D.C. May 10, 1977) (counsel not required to report to board); SEC v. Crown Corp., 9 SEC
DocKET 235, 235 (Lit. Rel. No. 7311) (D. Hawaii Mar. 12, 1976) (same).
59. Compare SEC v. Emersons Ltd., 9 SEC DOCKET 667, 668 (Lit. Rel. No. 7392) (D.D.C.
May 11, 1976) (counsel appointed by majority of independent directors) with SEC v. Generics
Corp. of Am., 8 SEC DocKET 1004, 1004 (Lit. Rel. No. 7224) (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 1976) (counsel
appointed by court).
60. See notes 55 & 58 supra.
61. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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mission places what may be analogous to its own agent in a position of
corporate power, the court appointment of directors may be an unnec-
essary remedy.
C. Practical Aspects of the Consent Decree
Settlement of SEC allegations by consent involves negotiation be-
tween the Commission's Enforcement Division and representatives of
the corporation.62 Although the opportunity to discuss alternatives and
develop awareness of respective concerns is constructive, the Commis-
sion exercises substantial leverage in determining the requirements of
the decree.63 Nonetheless, out-of-court disposition of the claims fre-
quently is advantageous to the corporation.
Even when corporations have a potentially successful defense, they
are often reluctant to resist Commission charges. First, litigation costs,
both in monetary outlay and in management time, are significant.'
Second, the adverse publicity of trial proceedings is undesirable.
65
Third, and most important, the findings of fact that lead to an unfavor-
able decision may give rise to indefensible private actions seeking large
damage awards.66 These practical considerations operate to force the
consent decree process upon corporations unless the Commission's
claims are completely groundless.
67
The SEC is similarly eager to settle by consent. Time and budgetary
limitations make out-of-court settlements attractive,6 and the Commis-
62. See Farrand, supra note 2, at 1784, 1796, 1806 n.142; Wolfson, supra note 8, at 24; Com-
ment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1192.
63. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Mis-
conduct andan Effective LegalResponse, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1252 (1977); Farrand, supra note 2,
at 1784, 1796 n.90, 1806 n.142.
64. See Merrifield, supra note 11, at 1627 n.160; Wolfson, supra note 8, at 19; Comment,
Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1192.
65. See Merrifield, supra ftote 11, at 1627 n.160; Wolfson, supra note 8, at 19; Comment,
Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1192.
66. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 1252 n.547; Merrifield, supra note 11, at 1627 n.160; Wolf-
son, supra note 8, at 19; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1192.
67. Initially, the Schlitz Brewing Co. decided to litigate Commission charges alleging illegal
kickbacks. See SECAccuses Schlitz of Making at Least $3 Million In IllegalPayments, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 8, 1977, at 5, col. 2. Later the company settled the case by a consent decree calling for
appointment of a special review person, maintenance of an audit committee composed of in-
dependent directors, and maintenance of a policy prohibiting questionable payments. SEC v.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 15 SEC DocIcT 278, 278 (Lit. Rel No. 8460) (E.D. Wis. July 7, 1978). See
note 92 infra.
68. See Wolfson, supra note 8, at 19; Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1192.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:507
sion may hesitate to pit its relatively young, inexperienced staff against
a corporation's highly skilled and seasoned trial attorneys.69 Beyond
these administrative concerns, the corporation's consent will subject the
terms desired by the SEC to less judicial scrutiny.70
Use of the consent decree to change the composition of corporate
boards has been accepted by both corporations and the SEC and ap-
proved by the judiciary.71 Although consent by the corporation is often
a prudent alternative, this settlement mechanism still carries with it
profound implications.72
II. SEC USE OF THE REMEDY
Although the Commission has not attempted to develop standards
for using the director appointment remedy,73 it nonetheless has enthu-
siastically adopted the concept.74 With increased public awareness of
69. See Wolfson, supra note 8, at 19.
70. See Farrand, supra note 2, at 1805-96; Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 740.
See also notes 30 supra & 100-03 infra and accompanying text.
71. Judicial approval was not always so readily obtainable. One of the earlier consent settle-
ments, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 5 SEC DOCKET 241 (Lit. Rel. No. 6531) (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1974), encoun-
tered difficulty from the bench. It was only after extensive argument by the Commission and the
defense counsel that Judge Gesell accepted the decree in principle. He initially believed that court
involvement in director appointments was improper and approved the settlement only with cer-
tain modifications. One of Judge Gesell's requirements was that the case be transferred to Cali-
fornia, the location of Mattel. The California judge also resisted court oversight of corporate
affairs. His approval came after additional argument by both parties and upon agreement that the
court would not endorse specific directors. See Mathews, supra note 2, at 1328.
As use of the remedy developed, however, it experienced less judicial resistance. Certain far-
reaching settlements apparently were approved without hesitation by the court. See, e.g., SEC v.
Eastern Freightways, Inc., 8 SEC DocKET 517 (Lit. Rel. No. 7171) (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1975). When
aspects of the Mattel settlements were appealed, Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979), the
court disallowed the attack on the original order. See notes 106-11 infra and accompanying text.
72. See Wolfson, supra note 8, at 20. Even with consent of the defendant and approval of the
court, such government intervention in private corporations runs counter to the principles of free
enterprise. See generally COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE, ALI-
ABA SYMPOsIUMS 1977-78 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARiES] and the following articles
therein: Coombe, Change Is Needed-From Within, at 196; Farrell, Corporations Are Already
Overgoverned, at 188; Greenough, Somebody Ought To Be on the Side of Corporations, at 533; and
Ruckleshaus, Federal Charter Threatens To Discard the Baby With the Bathwater, at 349.
73. The flexibility available in fashioning an appropriate remedy for corporate reform is a
distinct benefit derived from the consent decree process. Sporkin, supra note 9, at 122 (molding of
remedies important because parties have opportunity to be creative and helpful to investing
public).
74. After several early experiences with director appointments, the Commission began to
view the remedy as superior to the receivership that had often been sought in the past. In addition
to offering the public protection as good as or better than a receiver, new directors allowed "the
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corporate misconduct and the Commission's consequent determination
to take an active role in corporate governance,' 5 the boardroom pre-
dictably became a focal point for reform. Settlements appointing in-
dependent directors, and even issuing explicit directives to an entire
board, became more prevalent.7 6 The SEC, by extended application of
the remedy and utilization of other terms ancillary to the appointment
of directors, has gone beyond the legitimate goal of effectuating the
congressional purpose underlying the securities laws.
A. The Commission's Role in Corporate Governance
An increased sense of social responsibility, consistent with the na-
tional sentiment prevalent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, may ex-
plain the Commission's heightened concern with corporate governance.
More particularly, SEC initiative in this area grew from the discovery
of, and subsequent public outcry against, the corporate improprieties
during the 1972 presidential election campaign and the disclosure of
misappropriation of corporation funds in the form of questionable pay-
ments made both domestically and abroad .7 The Commission re-
sponded by implementing its management fraud program,78 which
marked the beginning of a period during which the SEC became more
involved and influential in internal corporate affairs.79
company to remain viable and avoid various acceleration events that sometimes result from the
appointment of a receiver" (e.g., the calling of bank loans). Sporkin, supra note 9, at 123.
75. It has become increasingly clear that the Commission is no longer content with its
traditional role of abstention from interference with corporate governance and is rest-
lessly seeking to affect the manner in which corporations are governed, the relationships
between their managements and shareholders, the constitution of their boards of direc-
tors, and the manner in which the various parts of the corporate community conduct
themselves and relate to each other.
Sommer, supra note 5, at 121. See generally Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real
Issues, 36 Bus. LAw. 173 (1981); Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflectons on Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1979); Rosenfeld, Corporate Govern-
ance, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 171 (1979).
76. See, e.g., SEC v. Basic Food Indus., Inc., 15 SEC DocKET 133 (Lit. ReL No. 8440)
(D.D.C. June 20, 1978). In BFI the settlement terms contained a provision directing the defend-
ants to make either a tender offer or a cash merger proposal to shareholders at a specified price.
Following these transactions, if BFI remained a public company the order required the appoint-
ment of three independent directors satisfactory to the Commission.
77. See Coffee, supra note 63, at 1115-16; Sommer, supra note 5, at 115.
78. See, eg., Freeman, The Legality of the SEC'S Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW.
1295 (Special Issue 1976).
79. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. See also Sporkin, supra note 9, at 122 (leaving
certain remedies to the private bar detrimental to public interest and no longer efficient-SEC will
continue to seek expanded orders).
Washington University Open Scholarship
520 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:507
Initially, the Commission contemplated developing guidelines for
the conduct of corporate directors."0 The plan was later abandoned
due to concern with intrusion into areas of state law and to difficulties
with confining the standards to securities-related matters.8' Instead,
the SEC employed less official methods to convey its attitude.
82
-In 1977, though, the Commission began to encourage the New York
Stock Exchange to consider a rule requiring listed companies to main-
tain an audit committee of the board that would be comprised of direc-
tors not affiliated with management.83 The Exchange later adopted this
concept.84
The Commission also rekindled its effort to outline the duties of di-
rectors and the proper standards they should employ.8 - The use of liti-
80. In 1973 SEC Chairman Cook outlined the need to establish standards for the conduct of
directors in securities matters. See Corporate Directors to Fulfill Responsibilities or Risk Liabil-
ity, Address before the Southern Methodist University School of Business Administration, SEC
News Release, April 6, 1973, at 4; [1973] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 197 at A-7 (April 11,
1973).
81. Though he had originally reaffirmed the commitment to develop guidelines, Chairman
Garrett withdrew the effort. See Corporate Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, Address
before the Thirteenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University School of
Law, SEC News Release, Oct. 3, 1974, at 4-5; [1974] SEC. REO. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 272 at A-Il
(Oct. 9, 1974).
In an earlier case, the Commission was presented with the opportunity to address the issue of
director standards. It declined to enunciate criteria for normative director conduct. In re
Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 176 (1964) (Securities Act does not purport to define such regula-
tory standards-diligence required to be evaluated in light of state and common law standards).
82. Former Commissioner Sommer has outlined the methods whereby the SEC promotes its
policies. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 125-44. These approaches are (1) 'jawboning" (Commis-
sioner statements), (2) litigation and settlement, (3) "coaxing" (voluntary disclosure), (4) statu-
tory transference, (5) rule making (direct and indirect), and (6) pronouncement (in the context of
settlements).
83. Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to Mr. William M. Batten, Chairman of
the New York Stock Exchange (May 11, 1976), refprintedin [1976] SEc. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
353 (special supplement), at 44-45 (May 19, 1976).
84. NEw YopK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, at A-29 (1978); 2 NYSE GUIDE
(CCH) 2495H (1977). See also SEC Exch. Act. Rel. No. 13346, 11 SEC DOCKET 1945 (Mar. 9,
1977).
85. See, e.g., SEC v. Shiell, I1 SEC DOCKET, 1664, 1665 (Lit. Rel. No. 7763) (N.D. Fla. Jan.
31, 1977) (directors' unwarranted reliance on corporate officers amounted to false representation
of the exercise of proper control and authority over management); In re National Tel. Co., SEC
Exch. Act Rel No. 14380, 13 SEC DOCKET 1393, 1396 (Jan. 16, 1978) (outside directors should be
expected to maintain a general familiarity with company's public communications); In re Stirling
Homex Corp., SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 11516, 7 SEC DocKEr 298, 299 (July 2, 1975) (directors'
acceptance of superficial management answers did not provide shareholders with protection in
fact).
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976), authorizes the
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gation and settlement, however, became the most effective means for
furthering SEC influence in corporate governance.8 6 Many investiga-
tions resulted in consent decrees requiring both court appointment of
independent directors satisfactory to the SEC and other forms of
boardroom reorganization.
B. A Broader SEC Policy Has Engulfed The Director Appointment
Remedy
In SEC v. Clinton Oil Co. 87 the Commission first sought appointment
of a receiver to take control of the business.88 The court refused and
instead supervised replacement of a majority of Clinton's board.89
Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, when confronted with securi-
ties law violations, the SEC often requested and was repeatedly granted
relief that focused on court-ordered changes in board composition.90
The remedy developed simultaneously with an apparent need to ad-
Commission to issue reports concerning its investigations and statements made by persons subject
to investigation. The Commission has announced its intention to continue issuing such reports "to
help. . . in administering its responsibilities under the federal securities laws. . . [and to] make
available information and provide disclosure in a simple and effective way." SEC Exch. Act Rel.
No. 15664, 17 SEC DOCKET 18, 19 (Mar. 21, 1979).
The § 21(a) power gives the Commission substantial latitude in exposing information generated
through its investigatory function and in espousing principles and theories. See Berkley & Smith,
Recent SEC Developments-Section 21(a) Reports: The Commission Continues to Set New Stan-
dards for Corporate Directors, 6 SEC. REG. LJ. 255, 255, 259 (1978); Seamons, The SEC and
Corporate Governance, 60 CHI. B. REc. 262, 265-68 (1979). At least one Commissioner believed
that publication of information should occur only under limited circumstances. See Separate
Statement of Commissioner Karmel, SEC Exch. Act ReL No. 15664, supra, at 20. The Stirling
Homex and National Telephone releases, supra, were made under § 21(a) authority.
86. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 130. See also SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE,
96TH CONG., 2D SEss., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 752-53 (Comm. Print
1980) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrrY].
87. 1 SEC DOCKET No. 11, at 23 (Lit. Rel. No. 5798) (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1973).
88. 1 SEC DOCKET No. 4, at 20 (Lit. Rel. No. 5715) (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 1973). Clinton's
management was charged with omitting material facts from public announcements; using pro-
ceeds from insider sales of stock, received in the first place by "exchange" with the company for
outside oil interests, to pay for these same interests; and price manipulation of Clinton stock.
Treadway, supra note 2, at 643.
89. 1 SEC DOCKET No. 11, at 23 (Lit. Rel. No. 5798) (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1973). Rather than
liquidate the company's assets, the court hoped that independent management would maintain
Clinton as a viable corporation. Treadway, supra note 2, at 644. See also Sporkin, supra note 9, at
123.
90. These orders were issued only with consent of the corporation. See notes 62-72 supra and
accompanying text. For a brief description of the way in which changes were required, see cases
cited in notes 31-61 supra.
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dress issues of corporate reform.9' Lack of an articulated standard and
inconsistent application of the remedy92 indicate that the SEC em-
ployed the remedy in pursuit of a policy not contemplated by Congress
in the enactment of the securities laws.
Expansion of relief beyond that expressly authorized by statute is
based on the courts' equity power to assist in the realization of congres-
sional purpose.93 Congress intended the SEC to infuse integrity into
the distribution and trading of securities and to require disclosure
designed to ensure fully informed investment decisions and effective
exercise of shareholder rights.94 Congress did not intend, except in the
Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 95 for the securities laws to regulate
the composition of corporate boards. To the extent that appointment
of one or even several directors can remedy and prevent specific securi-
ties law violations, congressional intent is effectively realized. Open-
ended orders that require a majority of new, nonaffiliated directors,
however, present an altogether different situation that implies a farther
reaching Commission purpose.96
91. See notes 77-86 supra and accompanying text. Focus on the boardroom to expedite this
reform was called for by many commentators. See generally C. BROWN, PurrING THE CORPO-
RATE BOARD TO WORK (1976); A. COHEN & R. LOEB, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE
DIRECTORS (1978); COMMENTARIES, supra note 72; R. MUELLER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DIREC-
TORS (1978); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); C.
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975).
92. Compare SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 15 SEC DOCKEr 278, 278 (Lit. Rel. No. 8460)
(E.D. Wis. July 7, 1978) (company charged with not disclosing $3 million in questionable pay-
ments-consented to appointment of person to review company's own investigation, maintenance
of previously established audit committee, and maintenance of policy prohibiting payments) with
SEC v. Emersons Ltd., 9 SEC DOCKET 667, 668 (Lit. Rel. No. 7392) (D.D.C. May 11, 1976)
(company charged with taking payments from Schlitz and with other accounting improprieties-
consented to eventual appointment of a majority of independent directors, new chief executive
and financial officers with no prior affiliation, a special financial reporting committee, and a spe-
cial counsel). One possible explanation for the disparity in treatment is that Schlitz had originally
planned to litigate the case. See note 67 supra. Another explanation may be that at time of the
Commission's action Schlitz had a majority of independent directors, see 1977 MOODY'S INDUS-
TAL MANUAL 3870, while Emersons did not, see 1976 MOODY'S OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 517
& 1975 MOODY'S OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 380.
93. See notes 13-30 supra and accompanying text.
94. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 118.
95. Section 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1976), requires that 40% of an investment com-
pany's board be independent.
96. This has not deterred the Commission from pursuing a policy aimed at independent
boards. "[Tbhe most important job we have to do is create a truly independent character on those
boards of directors, both from a remedial standpoint, when we found the problem, and from a
perspective standpoint." Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
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The consent decree process, interpreted to have special sanctuary
from judicial review,97 has allowed the SEC to use the director appoint-
ment remedy in implementing a broad policy of corporate reform. The
Commission's goals are laudable, and increased corporate accountabil-
ity is a beneficial outcome. 98 When lifted from its legal foundation,
however, the remedy cannot withstand close scrutiny.99
C. Judicial Responses
The entry of a consent decree is an exercise of judicial power.l °° The
order is appealable, however, only on grounds of fraud, lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, or lack of actual consent.10' These decrees reflect
neither judicial consideration of the limitations on a court's equity
power nor a balancing of the competing interests. 10 2 Consequently, an
order requiring the court to appoint outside directors pursuant to a
consent decree by no means signifies judicial acceptance of this
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 316-17 (1976) (statement by Roderick M. Hills, then Chair-
man of the SEC).
The SEC sees outsider directors as "private securities commissioners" who supplement
the limited resources of the Commission. It believes that requiring the appointment of
independent directors is more effective than enjoining future wrongdoing, and that that
sanction is not so severe as to prevent the company from carrying on its business. Inter-
view with Edward D. Herlihy, Branch Chief, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sept. 8, 1977); Interview with Theodore A. Levine, Assistant Director,
Division of Enforcement, SEC (Nov. 9, 1977). See generally Loo & Ratner, The SEC's
Role in Director Selection, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DUTIES AND REsPONSIBILI-
TIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 144-45 (1976); Sporkin, SEC Developments in Litigations
and the Moulding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. 121 (1974); Comment, Equitable Remedies
in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1210-14 (1975).
Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise, 76 MICH.
L REV. 581, 592 n.44 (1978). See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 100-03 infra and accompanying text.
98. Discussion of the effectiveness of independent corporate boards at achieving reform and
icreasing accountability is beyond the scope of this Note.
99. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Cf
SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380, 1382 (D. Colo. 1970) (approval of consent
judgment adjudicates plaintiffs relief, which is essential element of any judgment), aft'd, 464 F.2d
457 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973).
101. See. e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928); SEC v. Denett, 429
F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Comment, Equitable Remedies, supra note 2, at 1193.
102. See Block & Barton, Administrative Proceedings to Enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices
4act. 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 40, 49 n.31 (1979); Farrand, supra note 2, at 1806, 1809; Treadway, supra
note 2, at 639-40. Cf. Coffee, supra note 63, at 1252 (overwhelming SEC leverage in settlements
deters challenge from corporate defendants); Comment, Ancillary Relief, supra note 2, at 740 (due
to nature of consent settlements relative merits of relief not fully argued before the courts).
Washington University Open Scholarship
524 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:507
remedy. 103
Two cases, however, have sustained the validity of intrusion into cor-
porate affairs when consented to by the defendant. Both SEC v. Han-
dler1°" and International Controls Corp. v. Vesco' 05 denied collateral
attacks on court appointment of corporate officials. In Handler, one
former and two current directors of Mattel, Inc. challenged an order in
which a special counsel was appointed by a majority of new direc-
tors,' 0 6 themselves serving by the terms of a consent decree. 0 7 The
complaint alleged a violation of article III of the Constitution in that
the SEC delegated governmental power to a private person.'08 Holding
that a district court is "inherently invested with broad equitable powers
[i]n order to give effect to remedial statutes,"'0 9 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed dismissal of the suit." 0 Significantly, the court viewed the ap-
pointment of special counsel by consent as a "self-initiated corporate
investigation.""'
In Vesco, the corporation eventually agreed to appointment of a new
board of directors and special counsel instead of the receiver the SEC
initially sought." 2 The former controlling shareholder challenged this
settlement in state court,' claiming that the previous directors abdi-
cated their responsibility by accepting these terms.' 14  The special
counsel obtained a federal court injunction against prosecution of the
state actions, 115 and the Second Circuit affirmed those provisions of the
103. Block & Barton, supra note 102, at 49 n.31; Sommer, supra note 5, at 129.
104. 610 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
106. 610 F.2d at 657.
107. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 5 SEC DOcKET 241 (Lit. Rel. No. 6531) (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 1974). The
initial consent decree called for the appointment of two unaffiliated directors satisfactory to the
Commission. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 4 SEC DocKET 724, 724 (Lit. Rel. No. 6467) (D.D.C. Aug. 8,
1974). Subsequent to the issuance of this order, the board voluntarily disclosed to the SEC sup-
plementary information indicating additional material misstatements. The amended order, 5 SEC
DOCKET at 241, required a majority of independent directors. The two current directors in Han-
dier had voted in favor of accepting both settlements. 610 F.2d at 657.
108. 610 F.2d at 658-59.
109. Id at 659.
110. Id at 660.
111. Id at 659.
112. International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1338-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 932 (1974).
113. Id at 1352. The challenger was the controlling shareholder at the time the consent de-
cree was issued.
114. Id
115. Id
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injunction that barred interference with the court-appointed
directors." t6
By contrast, courts have denied the SEC's request for court appoint-
ment of independent directors in two cases litigated on their merits. In
SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 117 the court issued injunctions perma-
nently enjoining the corporation and affiliated persons from future vio-
lations of various securities laws."' Although finding that Falstaff had
committed the alleged violations, the court balanced the interests in-
volved and concluded that deterioration of Falstaff's internal corporate
structure by appointment of additional independent directors was un-
warranted. 19 The court noted that "in formulating such remedies, ...
[it] should not, without considerable justification, impose a remedy
which would in effect regulate areas traditionally left to internal corpo-
rate management."' 20
The court in SEC v. American Realty Trust 2 ' issued a similar re-
sponse, albeit by dictum. Although ultimately reversed on its require-
ment of scienter for the alleged violation, the district court clearly
stated it would entertain appointment of corporate officials only in the
most extreme cases.' 22 The court questioned its authority to "infringe
116. Id. Interference with the special counsel was also prohibited.
117. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,583 (D.D.C.), aj7'd on other
grounds, 629 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
118. Id at 94,473. The Commission charged in its complaint, and the court found, that Fal-
staff and its chairman had violated numerous securities laws. Included were the filing of a materi-
ally false and misleading "Schedule 13D" report, a misleading proxy statement, and a factually
inaccurate letter with the SEC concerning new independent accountants. Additionally, Falstaff
neglected to file certain § 16(a) reports, disregarded its disclosure responsibilities generally, and
failed to retain adequate securities counsel. Id at 94,472-73. The court retained jurisdiction in
order to implement and carry out the terms of its judgment. Id at 94,475.
119. Id at 94,473-74.
120. Id at 94,473. The court noted that a showing of securities law violations invokes its
equity jurisdiction, which in turn gives it considerable latitude in fashioning an appropriate rem-
edy. Id In addition to a request for appointment of independent directors, the Commission
sought an order reconstituting Falstafls audit committee to comprise only independent directors.
Id But the court also denied this relief, id at 94,474, even though it had found that Falstaff's
previous audit committee existed in name only and that a proxy statement noting the committee's
existence was therefore misleading.
121. 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'don otherground, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978).
122. Id at 1178. The Commission's complaint alleged that American Realty Trust and its
president filed a fraudulent and misleading prospectus for a $15 million debenture offering that
failed to disclose the complete details of certain loan transactions. Although recognizing that its
authority to grant ancillary relief was not expressly limited, the district court dismissed, holding
that a showing of scienter is necessary to find a § 17(a) violation. Id at 1171. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, ruling that negligence was a sufficient basis. 586 F.2d at 1007. The resulting district
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on activities traditionally controlled by the states"' 23 and concluded
that "[e]xcept in the most egregious cases, courts should not interfere
with corporate democracy."1 24
The Vesco and Handler holdings demonstrate that when the corpo-
ration consents, court-ordered changes in corporate structure will sur-
vive judicial scrutiny. These holdings should not be interpreted,
however, as an endorsement of the remedy in its own right. 25  The
disposition of the courts in Falstaff and American Realty, indicative of
judicial response to litigation of director appointment cases, raises is-
sues resolved only by balancing competing interests. Even when corpo-
rate defendants agree to settle by consent, courts should still employ
equitable balancing.
D. Critical Responses
Critics question the propriety of the court-appointed director remedy
for two reasons. First, they see judicial intervention in corporate struc-
ture as a dangerous entry into an area traditionally controlled by state
law. 26 The case for federal chartering of corporations, often sponsored
court order of permanent injunction made no mention of the SEC's prior request for ancillary
relief, which included removal of the president and appointment of additional trustees. SEC v.
American Realty Trust, 16 SEC DocKET 1308 (Lit. Rel. No. 8686) (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 1978).
123. 429 F. Supp. at 1177-78.
124. id at 1178.
125. See Farrand, supra note 2, at 1797. See also note 103 supra and accompanying text.
126. See, ag., SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1177-78 (E.D. Va. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); Kripke, supra note 75, at 192-94; Malley,
supra note 2, at 59; Rosenfeld, supra note 75, at 172; Comment, 4ncillary Relief, supra note 2, at
748. See generally Hetherington, supra note 75, at 215.
Corporations are chartered under the provisions of state corporation codes. Consent decrees
that affect the composition of corporate boards of directors conflict with these codes in four ways.
First, selection of directors is by the corporation's shareholders. Second, the power to remove
directors is held by the shareholders or the directors. Third, vacancies are filled by either share-
holders or directors for the remainder of the previous director's unexpired term. Finally, an in-
crease in the number of directors can be accomplished by amendment to the bylaws or, where
permitted by the charter, director action. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 301 (Deering 1977) (share-
holder vote to increase number); id § 301(a) (election by shareholders); id § 303 (removal by
shareholders); Id § 305(a) (vacancies may be filled by directors if bylaws permit, otherwise by
shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(b) (1974) (shareholder vote to increase number); Id
§ 141(d) (election by shareholders); id § 141(k) (removal by shareholders); Id § 223(a) (vacancies
filled by directors); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 704(3) (1981) (election by shareholders); Id
§ 706(1)(A) (shareholder vote at annual meeting to increase number); id § 706(l)(B) (vacancies
filled by shareholders, and directors if bylaws permit); id § 707 (removal by shareholders or direc-
tors); N.Y. Bus. Cop'. LAW § 702 (ConsoL 1976) (shareholders, and directors if authorized, vote
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with staunch support, 12 7 has failed to receive the congressional backing
necessary for its adoption.1 28 As a consequence, the state legislatures
are still the primary means for regulating internal corporate affairs.
Second, removing the power to select board members from a com-
pany's shareholders directly contravenes the principle of shareholder
democracy contemplated by the securities laws 129 and espoused by the
SEC.130 In this sense, a fundamental conflict exists in the justification
for the remedy: it tends to effectuate one legislative purpose while ig-
to increase number); id § 703 (election by shareholders); id § 705 (vacancies filled by sharehold-
ers, and directors if bylaws permit); id § 706 (removal by shareholders).
See also ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 36 (1980) (director election by shareholders); id
(amendment of bylaws or articles of incorporation to increase number); id § 38 (vacancies filled
by majority of remaining directors); id § 39 (directors removed by shareholder vote).
127. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 91; C. STONE, supra note 91; Cary, A
Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101 (1974); Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law. Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Henning, Federal and
Corporation Law: The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC REG. L.J. 362 (1976);
Schwartz, A Casefor Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976). See also the
following articles in COMMENTARIES, supra note 72: Black, A Call/or Federal Fiduciary Stan-
dards, at 234; Blumberg, A Needfor Supplementary National Legislation, at 343; Metzenbaum,
Reform is in the Air, at 507; Ratner, Regulating Management Through Corporation Law, at 138;
Sachnoff, The Present System Does Not Prevent Large Scale Fraud, at 230; Schwartz, The Para-
dgm of Federal Chartering, at 325; Will, Little Chance of State Action, at 503.
128. Proposals that advocated federal chartering date back to the constitutional convention.
James Madison's proposals were defeated as unnecessary and contributive to development of mo-
nopolies. J. MADISON, NOTES ON DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 638 (1966). In the late
1800s, Congress passed the antitrust laws to thwart the abuses of business power in spite of urgings
that federal licensing of corporations be adopted. Watkins, Federalization of Corporations, 13
TENN. L. REV. 89, 92 (1935). In the early 1900s several bills authorizing federal incorporation
were introduced in Congress, and Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft also
favored the concept. Id at 93; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Chal-
lenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 126 (1972). Again in the 1930s, such recommendations were issued.
Two Senators were joined by the Federal Trade Commission and the New York Stock Exchange
m advocating federal licensing. Sommer, supra note 5, at 118. Congress, however, rejected the
proposals and instead focused on disclosure as a regulatory mechanism. Id Two bills, introduced
in the 96th Congress, would have superseded state corporation codes in many significant areas.
The Corporate Democracy Act, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by N.Y. Rep.
Rosenthal); The Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) (introduced by Ohio Sen. Metzenbaum). For an article outlining the key features of the
two bills, see Trowbridge, Congress and Corporate Governance, CORP. Di., Sept./Oct. 1980, at 21.
129. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947) (Congress intended to
require opportunity for operation of fair corporate suffrage in enacting Securities Exchange Act of
1934), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934) (with
every equity security bought on a public exchange should attach the right of fair corporate
suffrage).
130. See, eg., Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 16656, 18 SEC DOcKET 997 (Nov. 21, 1979);
Securities Exch. Act ReL No. 16104, 18 SEC DOCKET 91 (Aug. 13, 1979).
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noring another distinct goal of the same legislation."3 '
The tension between state corporation codes and federal regulatory
power cannot be easily resolved. The Supreme Court has indicated
that state law may not hinder protection of federal interests. 32 In the
pursuit of federal objectives, however, federal actions must not unduly
interfere with legitimate state interests.13  In Burks v. Lasker the Court
held that when state law is available, a court should apply it, but only
to the extent consistent with the federal legislative scheme. 34  The
Burks approach, when extended by analogy to the consent decree issue,
results in weighing the benefits of director appointments in promoting
investor and shareholder protection against the mandate for utilizing
shareholder initiative in selecting corporate directors.
Both boardroom policy and corporate suffrage can theoretically pro-
mote shareholder interests. 3 5 In determining the appropriate balance,
then, the court should consider the type of protection the shareholder
most desires. Although the debate continues as to the amount of par-
ticipation in corporate governance the shareholders desire, 36 there is
little doubt that concern for the corporation's economic performance is
their paramount consideration. 37 Complete usurpation of the right to
131. This conflict would tend to instill particular significance in the courts' role of balancing
the equities and analyzing the facts of an individual case. See notes 21-24 supra and accompany-
ing text.
132. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,434 (1964). See also Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815,
819 (1st Cir. 1964), cer. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
133. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580
(1956).
134. 441 U.S. 471, 480, 486 (1979). In Burks v. Lasker the Supreme Court stated: "It is true
that in certain areas we have held that federal statutes authorize the federal courts to fashion a
complete body of federal law. Corporation law, however, is not such an area." Id at 477 (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, although the Burks Court cited the proposition in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964), that "federal law ... would, where thefacts required, control the appro-
priateness of redress despite the provisions of state corporation law," 441 U.S. at 477 (emphasis
added), the Court also noted that "Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state
corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a
federal statute," id at 478. In effect, the Court has directed lower federal courts to engage in a
process that attempts to balance equitably the interests of state law (which would not permit fed-
eral courts to appoint directors) with the need to redress invasion of a federally protected rights.
See note 26 supra and accompanying text. This returns the analysis to the language in Borak that
requires close scrutiny of the particular fact pattern.
135. The potential for increased scrutiny of corporate policy by independent directors com-
bined with the disclosure requirements that support the goal of shareholder participation can
serve to deter management misconduct.
136. See CORPORATE ACCOuNTABILrrY, supra note 86, at 66.
137. See id See generally Coffee, supra note 63, at 1259; Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling
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elect directors would prompt shareholder displeasure, but less resent-
ment and perhaps even approval may result if court-appointed direc-
tors assist in preserving or restoring a corporation's financial health. 3 '
Coupled with this analysis is the recognition that shareholder suf-
frage has not been an effective means for either preventing corporate
wrongdoing or removing misfeasant management. 139 The proxy rules
promulgated under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act 14 have
advanced corporate democracy, but further SEC intervention may be
necessary to afford actual protection from securities law violations.
The acceptable degree of SEC intervention into corporate affairs and
resolution of the conflict between state law and the competing congres-
sional objectives are decisions properly left to the judicial process.
III. MODIFICATION OF THE SEC APPROACH TO THE DIRECTOR
APPOINTMENT REMEDY
Indications that the breadth of influence the SEC enjoyed through its
enforcement mechanisms in the 1970s would be subject to retrench-
ment in the 1980s1 'l have become reality. 42 The process began with
Supreme Court limitations on the reach of the federal securities
Shareholders'Rights and Corporate Responsibility New Guidelinesfor Management, 1978 DuKE L.
J. 819, 824; Varner, The Role and Function of Corporate Directors, Williams World, 3d Quarter
Report 1980, at 23, 25. See also Shareowner Attitude Survey, Opinion Research Corp. Study
63,058 (1978).
138. Shareholders may be willing to engage in a balancing process similar to that which the
courts should undertake. They may accept enough federal intrusion into corporate affairs to re-
store value to their investment, but on the other hand desire enough board autonomy to permit
uncompromised pursuit of profit.
139. From 1970 through 1977, 50,668 proxy solicitations for the election of directors were filed
with the Commission. Elections were contested by shareholder groups in just 196 instances. In
only 42 of the contests were nonmanagement nominees elected. These statistics are derived from
the Annual Reports of the SEC. See, e.g., 43 SEC ANN. REP. 107 (1977). In 1978 the Commission
ceased to include this data in its Annual Report.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1976).
141. See Carrington, Piliero, Backer of Changes at the SEC, Is Controversial Contenderfor Top
Post, Wall. St. J., Jan. 23, 1981, at 5, col. 1; Crock & Landauer, Reagan Team Urges New Direction
For SEC, Suggests Sporkin May Go, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1981, at 27, col. 4; Gerth, SE.C. ' Future
Focus in Doubt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1981, § D, at Dl, col. 3.
142. In 1980 the Commission instituted the fewest number of cases since 1969, secured the
fewest number of injunctions since 1973, and had the fewest number of defendants enjoined since
1968. 46 SEC ANN. REP. 141 (1980); 43 SEC ANN. REP. 325 (1977). See Eisenberg, SECInjunc-
tive Actions, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 901, 901, 906 (1981); Kripke, supra note 75, at 194-95; Vilkin,
Fedders: New Look At the SEC, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 3, coL 1, at 25, col. 1. Cf. Mathews,
supra note 16, at 216-20 (SEC will likely increase its use of administrative proceedings, presuma-
bly decreasing its use of civil injunction).
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laws.' 43 In addition to the Court's concern that SEC power be kept
within legal bounds, federal agency intrusion in general into areas of
state law and free enterprise encounters opposition on philosophical
grounds.'" The director appointment remedy, when expanded beyond
justifiable limits, thus is particularly vulnerable to attack. 45
A countervailing consideration is the need for a strong enforcement
policy to curb various abuses in the securities industry.' 46 Although
corporations, out of either fear or reasoned acquiescence, have re-
sponded to the call for reform and accountability, 47 the SEC, and par-
ticularly its Enforcement Division, have actively pursued corporate
misconduct and initiated productive remedial measures.' 4
The question, then, becomes one of degree. Rather than have the
director appointment remedy removed from its enforcement arsenal,
the Commission should restore the remedy to the foundation upon
which its justification is based. To facilitate this return and to rebut
legitimate criticism, the Commission should re-evaluate and modify its
use of the consent decree as a means to promote general policy.
A. Re-evaluation of Litigation and Settlement as a Means for Policy
Promotion
Although use of a litigation and settlement process that results in
appointment of independent directors is certain to have an impact on
corporate governance, 149 the SEC should not view the process itself as a
means to accomplish this goal.' 50 When the Commission uses the over-
riding policy of a more independent board as an underlying justifica-
143. See, ag., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
144. See, e.g., Fanre1, Corporations Are Already Overgoverned, reprinted in COMMENTARIES,
supra note 72, at 188.
145. See notes 117-40 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legal limitations
on a court issuing an injunction that includes the appointment of directors as ancillary relief, see
notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 141; SEC Enforcer Blasts Proposals to Change Division,
Cut Staff, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
147. See, eg., Trowbridge, supra note 128, at 21-24.
148. See, ag., Varner, supra note 137, at 23.
149. See Sommer, supra note 5, at 130.
150. See Loomis, The SEC and Corporate Governance, reprinted in COMMENTARIES, stpra
note 72, at 182, 185 ("[tlhe concept of improvement of corporate governance by enforcement raises
significant questions").
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tion for the appointment of directors, the remedy loses its legal basis
and becomes subject to criticism. In addition, other methods exist
whereby the Commission can advance the policy of structuring a cor-
porate board with directors who have no management affiliation.' 5
Furthermore, if the policy is to have a meaningful impact on corporate
governance, voluntary adoption is preferable.
15 2
The trend toward greater independence of the board from manage-
ment is a positive development in corporate governance. The Commis-
sion may illustrate the benefits derived from outside directors by
pointing to cases of alleged securities law violations that were settled by
consent with court approval.'5 3 This may prove as effective in deter-
ring misconduct as it is in promoting independent boards. If, however,
courts withdraw their support for the remedy, they will deprive the
SEC of an effective method for resolving the supposed violation of se-
curities laws.
B. Elimination of Independent Special Counsel
Requiring the appointment of a special counsel responsible to the
Commission increases the likelihood of a charge that the SEC has in-
truded too far into internal corporate affairs.'5 4 The board of directors
has the authority to engage a special agent or counsel and, theoreti-
cally, has the judgment to know when such action is appropriate. 155
Situations requiring particular expertise should result in the directors
hiring a competent individual who will be responsible solely to them.
When the Commission believes that outside directors will effectively
151. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
152. Voluntary action on the part of the corporate community has had a positive impact on
governance reform. Trowbridge, supra note 128, at 21-24; Varner, supra note 137, at 24. The
Commission itself looks to self-regulatory organizations as having "a vital role to play with respect
to regulation of the trading market and their member firms. In addition.., they can contribute
Nignificantly to the corporate accountability process." CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note
s6, at 646. Additionally, voluntary attempts at reform and problem solving in general allow the
Commission to function from a mode of guidance rather than one of enforcement.
153. Clinton Oil Co. is a good example. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text. The
court's hope for viability has been realized. The company, now Energy Reserves Group, had net
income of $13.9 million in 1980. See 1981 MOODY'S OTC INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1324.
154. Too often the counsel is akin to an agent of the Commission. Questions arise as to
whether the counsel is aware of the obligation owed to the corporation and its shareholders and as
to how he or she will respond when confronted with arguably proper, but conflicting, alternatives.
155. The Commission may want to be in a position to suggest this approach and even assist in
locating a suitably trained and experienced individual. This person's authority, however, should
stem from, and his or her accountability should be measured by, the company's board of directors.
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address corporate improprieties, it should allow them to act unfettered
by additional intervention. 15 6
C. Expanded Use of Shareholder Initiative
Whenever possible, SEC settlements should include provisions that
allow shareholders to choose between alternatives 157 and vote on
outside director nominations. 5 8 Not all cases permit this approach,
particularly those that require the immediate performance of directo-
rial duties. 59 The SEC could pursue and the courts should approve
other plans that would, for example, summon a shareholder vote after a
specified length of time or once the corporation has complied with the
settlement terms.' 60 The cases in which shareholders had the opportu-
nity to exercise a preference demonstrate that the equitable relief can
be creative. Expanded use of the shareholder vote also serves to pla-
cate those who would challenge the remedy on corporate democracy
grounds. 161
D. Appointment of Directors With QualKcations Relevant to the
Alleged Violation
The most needed modification of the current SEC approach is the
appointment of directors who have specific training or experience in
156. The inconsistency in appointing outside directors and then requiring a special counsel to
do their work raises speculation that the Commission policy regarding director appointments is
focused as much on board composition as on remedial action.
157. See, ag., SEC v. Basic Food Indus., Inc., 15 SEC DocKEr 133, 134 (Lit. Rel. No. 8440)
(D.D.C. June 20, 1978) (public shareholders elect either a tender offer or cash merger); SEC v.
Roussel, 10 SEC DOCKET 263, 264 (Lit. Rel. No. 7529) (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1976) (shareholders
may either rescind stock sale or receive differential to equal original tender offer price).
158. See, eg., SEC v. Invesco Int'l Corp., 12 SEC DocKEr 1369 (Lit. Rel. No. 8031) (N.D. Ga.
July 19, 1977) (company to nominate, shareholders to elect enough unaffiliated directors to consti-
tute a majority); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 10 SEC DOCKET 398 (Lit. Rel. No. 7544)
(D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1976) (company to submit resolution to shareholder vote for approval of board
increase by two independent directors).
159. See, ag., SEC v. First Mortgage Investors, 9 SEC DOCKET 856 (Lit. Rel. No. 7072) (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 8, 1975) (new trustees appointed to form executive committee-chairman of executive
committee to act as chief executive officer of company).
160. See, e.g., SEC v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 17 SEC DocKEr 406 (Lit. Rel. No. 8733)
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1979) (company to nominate and recommend for election, for at least three
years, a minimum of three independent directors). TheMarlene settlement embodies an approach
that allows courts to engage in the balancing process that should precede the issuance of a consent
order. On the one hand, there is a need for independent oversight of corporate affairs; on the
other hand, shareholders and the board retain important aspects of their traditional roles.
161. See notes 124 & 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
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the area of the alleged violations. Qualified directors can more effec-
tively address and remedy the allegations set out in the Commission's
complaint. This factor should favorably affect the equitable balancing
employed in the approval process.' 62  This arrangement is also more
efficient for the corporation, because the accelerated compliance will
cause less injury to shareholder interests. 163 Appointments that specifi-
cally outline the duties of the new directions in terms of their estab-
lished talents encroach less upon the general management
responsibilities of the elected directors. 1" Additionally, these guide-
lines will permit the SEC to be less involved in the selection process,
further reducing the tension with state law and shareholder
democracy. 16
5
IV. SEC PRECEDENT IN SELECTION OF SPECIALLY QUALIFIED
DIRECTORS BY A CORPORATE DEFENDANT
Two recent settlements illustrate the willingness of the Commission
to modify its previously dominant role in the consent process. In re
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 16 an administrative proceeding brought to
determine whether Occidental (Oxy) failed to disclose certain environ-
mental matters that could have had a substantial impact on its financial
condition, was settled by an offer from Oxy to which the SEC con-
sented. 167 Oxy undertook the appointment of a new director who was
satisfactory to the Commission and who had delineated responsibilities
specifically addressing the issues raised by the investigation. 6  The
162. An individual trained in a particular area will be better able to remedy the existing prob-
lem and develop policies for future avoidance so that appointed entry into the corporate structure
is less offensive.
163. In this sense, shareholders may be eager to forego the electoral process, provided that a
check on undue infringement of their rights is built into the system.
164. The authority delegated to the board by the shareholders is one of general management.
An appointed director with specifically outlined duties creates less of a barrier to the flow of
internal corporate power.
165. One of the conceptual difficulties with court-appointed corporate officials approved by
the SEC is the leverage exercised by the Commission in the consent process. See note 63 supra.
In appointing an official independently qualified to address the particular charge, the court ad-
dresses the corporation's needs more than the Commission's wants.
166. Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 16950, 20 SEC DocKEr 567 (July 2, 1980).
167. Id at 576-77.
168. Id at 576. The new director would be responsible for reporting to the full board and
recommending procedures to ensure the disclosure of environmental matters in accordance with
the securities laws and to amend reports currently on file. Id Potential costs of compliance with
other federal and state laws, maximum civil penalties, and the amount of alleged third party
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Commission's access to the director was limited to a manner agreed
upon with Oxy.169
The elements of the Occidental Petroleum settlement are preferable
to the type of orders previously obtained by the SEC for three reasons.
First, responsibility for correcting and preventing incomplete disclosure
rested entirely with the existing board of directors. 170  Second, the
board's search for and appointment of the new director was more con-
sistent with the requirements of state law. 171 Finally, because the only
emphasis of the settlement was upon informing and advising the board,
effectuation of congressional purpose did not become subservient to the
pursuit of any other policy.172
In SEC v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 171 the complaint alleged misap-
propriation of corporate funds in connection with foreign business. 174
Tesoro consented to nominate and recommend for election by share-
holders a new director satisfactory to the Commission. 7  The new di-
rector was to serve only a three-year term. 76 He or she was also to
become chairman of Tesoro's Audit Committee and coordinate efforts
to formulate and implement policies designed to prevent occurrence of
matters such as those alleged in the complaint and to oversee future
foreign transactions. 177
In the Occidental Petroleum and Tesoro settlements, control over
questionable corporate conduct remained within the corporate struc-
ture. The SEC, however, did not pursue its compliance policies with
any less vigor than usual. Occidental Petroleum and Tesoro demon-
strate that federal agencies can hold corporations to high standards of
claims were to be determined and fully reported to the board and the Commission. Id The
director, with assistance from Oxy's newly elected senior environmental official and an independ-
ent consulting firm, was also to describe legal, interpretative, or technological problems in which
he was unable to formulate any recommendations. Id Finally, Oxy indicated a policy of full
cooperation by permitting the new director, at his discretion, to review company documents and
interview employees and by authorizing him to retain experts reasonably necessary in the comple-
tion of his duties. Id at 576-77.
169. Id at 576.
170. The power delegated to the board by the shareholders thus remained within its proper
boundaries.
171. See note 126 supra.
172. See notes 87-99 supra and accompanying text.
173. 21 SEC DocKEr 679 (Lit. ReL No. 9236) (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1980).
174. Id at 680.
175. Id
176. Id
177. Id
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accountability without sacrificing the qualities of independence that are
cornerstones of the free enterprise system. The SEC should not dilute
its enforcement efforts, but instead should modify its use of the director
appointment remedy to utilize the principles underlying state law and
corporate democracy. More particularly, by seeking election of indi-
viduals specifically qualified to address the corporation's problems, the
Commission can use its expertise less as a vehicle for dominance and
more for the purpose of guidance. 7
8
V. CONCLUSION
The court appointment of directors, developed by the SEC in re-
sponse to securities law violations, has proven effective as an ancillary
remedy. Properly employed, the remedy can serve to protect the in-
vesting public's interests by offering remediation of past infractions and
serving as a deterrent to future misconduct.
The SEC, however, has extended the remedy beyond the limits justi-
fied by equitable considerations.' 79 As a new era of federal regulatory
power is anticipated, 180 the Commission should modify its approach to
comport more with the equity principles upon which the remedy
rests.' 8' By withdrawing those features subject to well-founded objec-
tions182 and by specifically outlining the qualifications and duties of' 3
those individuals who are to become the directors, the Commission can
implement this modification. By adopting a modified approach, the
Commission can supplement its policing function with a quality of
guidance available only from an experienced regulatory agency.
Congress will not likely amend the securities laws to authorize the
court appointment of directors. 84 The remedy therefore will remain
178. The Commission may thus be able to recognize the progress made through voluntary
adoption of well-reasoned approaches to corporate reform.
179. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text. Other regulatory agencies may find the
remedy useful when properly employed. Often their own enforcement mechanisms are either
ineffective or counterproductive. Monetary fines, levied in amounts large enough to evoke corpo-
rate response, serve to diminish the company's net worth. This in turn harms the shareholder
public, which is the object of the protective legislation in the first place. For an article outlining
some difficulties with regulatory compliance, see Court Created Receivershos Emerging As Remedy
for Persistent Non-Compliance with Environmental Laws, 10 ENVT'L L. RaP. 10059 (1980).
181. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 149-56 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 162-78 supra and accompanying text.
184. But see Wolfson, supra note 8. Professor Wolfson advocates legislation that will permit
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part of the equitable relief that federal courts are empowered to fash-
ion. 1 85 The ultimate responsibility for checking SEC abuse of the rem-
edy thus lies with the judiciary. Courts should not hesitate to
disapprove terms that fail to balance the competing interests equitably,
even when the settlements are entered with the consent of the corporate
defendant. The SEC, on the other hand, should not hesitate to employ
the director appointment remedy when it can tailor the settlement
terms to specifically address the alleged impropriety.
Stephen C. Jones
court-appointed directors only in exceptional situations, that is, after certain criteria have been
met. Once activated, the provisions allowing for appointment should require outlining of duties
and responsibilities. Id at 24. The Proposed Federal Securities Code does not change the current
state of the law in this area. See ALT FED. SEC. CODE § 1819(1) (court has authority to grant
appropriate ancillary and other relief) (Proposed Official Draft 1978); id § 1904(i) (nothing in
Code affects application of state law pertaining to appointment of directors).
185. The concept that gives rise to this power anticipates judicial scrutiny. Only when the
particular facts are analyzed in terms of the proposed settlement can the case be fairly
adjudicated.
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